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I. INTRODUCTION
What do 1.5 million women have in common? According to the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,'
very little. Despite allegations that Wal-Mart, one of the nation's largest
retail corporations, engaged in a systematic pattern of discrimination
resulting in the continuous marginalization of female employees, the
Supreme Court reversed an order granting class certification to over 1.5
million female claimants.
Fifty-four-year old Wal-Mart greeter, Betty Dukes, had worked at
the company for six years before realizing that she had not been given
the same opportunities for promotion as her male colleagues.' Dukes
was later demoted for misconduct after violating a store policy, an act
* Executive Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2013, University of
Miami School of Law; B.A. 2010, Duke University. Thank you to Professor Anthony V. Alfieri
for his guidance on this Note and for being an invaluable mentor throughout my law school career.
Special thanks to my parents, grandparents, Daniel, Lauren, and Peter for all of their love and
encouragement.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. Jeffrey Toobin, Betty Dukes v. Wal-Mart, NEW YORKER, June 20, 2011, http://www.new
yorker.com/onlinelblogs/newsdesk/2011/06/betty-dukes-v-walmart.html.
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she claimed was common practice among employees. 3 Believing that
her demotion was motivated by prejudice, she filed suit against the com-
pany for discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.4 Once a
part-time cashier earning minimum wage, Betty Dukes became the face
of the largest gender discrimination class action lawsuit in this nation's
history in a battle against the world's largest private employer.5 Repre-
senting herself, and others similarly situated, Dukes alleged that Wal-
Mart systemically perpetuates discrimination by paying its female
employees less and giving them fewer promotions than men.6 The fight
for class certification that began over ten years ago finally came to an
end, however, when Justice Scalia, along with the Court's more con-
servative justices, determined that the proposed class members had too
little in common to meet the commonality requirement necessary for
certification. While this result will surely have far-reaching conse-
quences for future class action lawsuits, its effect on individual Title VII
liability is also quite palpable.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of class
certification, it necessarily delved into the merits of the plaintiffs' cause
of action and the sufficiency of the evidence presented. Consequently,
its decision goes beyond the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a testament to the diffi-
culty of future employment discrimination lawsuits for plaintiffs
attempting to sue employers on a theory of systemic disparate treatment.
The Court's skepticism of the Dukes plaintiffs' evidence indicates a
willingness to give employers the benefit of the doubt absent overt dis-
criminatory treatment.
In this Paper I focus on the effect that the Supreme Court's decision
will have on plaintiffs asserting Title VII claims on an individual basis.
The Court's holding undoubtedly speaks volumes on the future of class
certification and the evidentiary burden required of potential class mem-
bers. What is less certain, however, are the consequences it will have on
employment discrimination claims as a whole.
In Part Two of this Note I discuss the Dukes decision in depth,
looking at the majority's reasoning for its decision to deny class certifi-
cation to over 1.5 million female Wal-Mart employees. Importantly, the
majority analyzed the evidence supporting the plaintiffs' substantive
claims, thus intertwining the class certification issue with the merits of
3. Paul Elias, Betty Dukes, Wal-Mart Greeter, Leads Class Action Suit, HUFFLNGTON POST
(May 1, 2010, 3:47 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/01/betty-dukes-walmart-greet-
n_559892.html.
4. Id.
5. Id. (noting that many "have dubbed the legal battle 'Betty v. Goliath"').
6. Id.
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their discrimination claims. Finding the evidence insufficient, the Court
made a significant statement on the burden required of Title VII plain-
tiffs asserting claims of disparate treatment similar to those asserted by
the Dukes class members.
Part Three looks at the nature of modem workplace discrimination
and how it is has evolved from the days of overt employer bias. In
today's society, employer discrimination very rarely manifests itself bla-
tantly. On the contrary, overt discrimination has become more and more
taboo, spurring most companies to create anti-discrimination policies
and embrace diversity initiatives. This does not mean, however, that dis-
crimination does not still run rampant in the employment context.
Rather, employers discriminate against minority groups in subtle ways,
resulting in the overall marginalization of these groups in terms of hir-
ing, pay, and promotions.
In Part Four, I discuss how litigants pursue employment discrimi-
nation claims under Title VII. Title VII is often divided into two catego-
ries-disparate impact claims and disparate treatment claims. Disparate
impact claims are based on neutral employment decisions that have a
disproportionately adverse impact on a particular minority group. Con-
versely, disparate treatment claims are based on allegations that the
employer's actions were motivated by discriminatory intent. Based on
the current landscape of workplace discrimination, more and more plain-
tiffs-like those in Dukes-are seeking relief under a theory of systemic
disparate treatment. Under this theory, the focus is not on the individual
decisionmaker, but rather on how the structure and organization of the
company as a whole make it susceptible to bias. In Dukes, the plaintiffs
asserted that Wal-Mart had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation by giving local managers broad discretion over employment deci-
sions. This discretion, in turn, allegedly resulted in biased
decisionmaking that was left unchecked by Wal-Mart's corporate
headquarters.
Finally, Part Five analyzes the interplay between the Supreme
Court's denial of class certification in Dukes and the future of systemic
disparate treatment claims. In support of their claims for disparate treat-
ment, the Dukes plaintiffs relied on three types of evidence: social sci-
ence testimony, statistical evidence, and anecdotal evidence. Despite the
acceptance of such evidence by courts in the past, the majority rejected
it as insufficient to create commonality as required under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even more importantly, however, it
highlighted the Court's skepticism of such evidence with respect to the
merits of the plaintiffs' Title VII claims. Because the evidence relied
upon by the Dukes class is representative of the evidence relied upon by
20131
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most litigants asserting liability under Title VII, the Court's opinion
sheds light on the difficulty that disparate treatment claimants now face.
As discriminatory decisionmaking in the workplace becomes more and
more subtle, the victims of its aftermath will be less and less likely to
succeed in obtaining relief in a legal forum.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
In June 2001, Betty Dukes, along with five other named plaintiffs,
sought to represent nearly 1.5 million female Wal-Mart employees in an
employment discrimination class action lawsuit against the retail con-
glomerate.7 The plaintiffs alleged that the company discriminated
against them on the basis of their gender by denying them equal pay and
promotions in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.8 Spe-
cifically, the plaintiffs claimed that women employed in Wal-Mart stores
are paid less than men in comparable positions, receive fewer promo-
tions to management positions, and must wait longer than male employ-
ees to advance.9 The proposed class consisted of "all women employed
at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time since December 26,
1998 who have been or may be subjected to Wal-Mart's challenged pay
and management track promotions policies and practices."' ° The plain-
tiffs sought both injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as an award of
backpay."
The crux of the Dukes plaintiffs' allegations concerned the broad
discretion given to local store managers over pay and promotion deci-
sions.1 2 They did not allege that Wal-Mart had an explicit policy against
the advancement of female employees. Rather, they claimed that the
local managers' extensive discretion over employment decisions is exer-
cised in a manner that disproportionately favors men, resulting in dispa-
rate treatment of female employees. 3 Local store managers may
increase the wages of hourly employees with limited corporate oversight
and may apply their own subjective criteria when choosing "support
managers" and selecting candidates for management training. 14 Thus,
the plaintiffs' theory of discrimination rested on a finding that Wal-
7. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 141 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd 603 F.3d 571
(9th Cir. 2010), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 141-42.
11. Id. at 141.
12. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
13. Id. at 2548.
14. Id. at 2547.
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Mart's "corporate culture" allows bias to penetrate the decision-making
of local managers and, furthermore, that Wal-Mart was aware of the
resulting discriminatory treatment of its female employees. 5
In addition to Wal-Mart's decentralized management structure, the
plaintiffs primarily relied on three sources of evidence in support of their
motion for class certification-expert testimony concerning Wal-Mart's
corporate culture, expert statistical evidence revealing disparities
between male and female employees, and anecdotal evidence.' 6
Dr. William Bielby, a sociological expert, used a social framework
analysis to examine Wal-Mart's policies and practices and evaluated
them "against what social science shows to be factors that create and
sustain bias and those that minimize bias."' 7 He testified that "gender
stereotypes are especially likely to influence personnel decisions when
they are based on subjective factors, because substantial decisionmaker
discretion tends to allow people to seek out and retain stereotyping-con-
firming information and ignore or minimize information that defies ste-
reotypes."'" Dr. Bielby ultimately concluded that Wal-Mart's personnel
policies and strong corporate culture make pay and promotion decisions
vulnerable to gender bias.19
The plaintiffs also submitted statistical evidence showing dispari-
ties in pay and promotion for men and women.2" Dr. Richard Drogin, a
statistician, ran regression analyses for each of the regions containing
Wal-Mart stores.21 Comparing the number of women promoted to man-
agement positions with the percentage of women in the pool of hourly
workers, he concluded that there were "statistically significant dispari-
ties between men and women at Wal-Mart in terms of compensation and
promotions, that these disparities are widespread across regions, and that
they can be explained only by gender discrimination. '"22 Dr. Marc
Bendick, a labor economics expert, also concluded that Wal-Mart pro-
motes a lower percentage of women than its competitors.
2 3
Finally, the plaintiffs presented anecdotal evidence in the form of
sworn declarations. 24 In their declarations, potential class members testi-
fied that they were denied promotions and paid less than male employ-
15. Id. at 2548.
16. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 600 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541
(2011).
17. Id. at 601.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 603-04.
21. Id. at 604.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 610.
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ees on account of their sex.2 - They also related specific accounts of
discriminatory treatment at stores throughout the country. For example,
female employees were regularly referred to as "girls" and as "little
Janie Qs. ' ' 26 Others similarly testified that store managers discouraged
them from applying for management positions, displayed outright favor-
itism toward male employees, and justified paying male employees more
because they had families to support.2 7
B. Procedural History
The district court granted in part the plaintiffs' motion for class
certification.28 It found that the plaintiffs had met all of requirements set
forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 29 and that
the class could be certified with respect to their equal pay claim and with
respect to the issues of liability and injunctive and declaratory relief.30
On rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit substantially affirmed the dis-
trict court's certification order.3 ' It concluded that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the Rule 23(a) elements were
satisfied.3 2 With respect to certification under Rule 23(b)(2), the court
held that the plaintiffs' backpay claims could be certified as a 23(b)(2)
class because they did not predominate over the requests for declaratory
and injunctive relief.33 The circuit court additionally held that the class
action could proceed in a manner both manageable and in accordance
with due process.34
C. The Supreme Court's Decision
On June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's
certification order.3 The Justices unanimously held that the class was
improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 36 The Court split five to four,
25. Id.
26. Motion for Certification at 13-14, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D.
Cal. 2004) (No. C-01-2253-MJJ).
27. Id.
28. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aft'd 603 F.3d 571
(9th Cir. 2010), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
29. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) lists four requirements for class certification: numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.
30. Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 143, 169. On grounds of unmanageability, the district court denied
certification with respect to the plaintiffs' promotion claims for lost pay as to those class members
for whom no such data was available.
31. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010).
32. Id. at 615.
33. Id. at 619-20.
34. Id. at 624.
35. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2541 (2011).
36. Id. at 2558.
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however, in deciding the issue of commonality under Rule 23(a).3 7 The
majority ruled that the plaintiffs had not established the existence of a
common question and therefore could not satisfy the certification
requirement under Rule 23(a)(2). 38 Justice Scalia, writing for the major-
ity, noted that the plaintiffs were seeking "to sue about literally millions
of employment decisions at once" and that those reasons lacked "some
glue" holding them together.39 As a result, the plaintiffs' claims could
not produce a common answer to the reason behind Wal-Mart's employ-
ment decisions.40
In deciding that the Dukes class members did not meet Rule 23's
certification requirements, the Court delved into an analysis of the mer-
its of the underlying claims.4' The Court cited General Telephone Co. v.
Falcon42 for the proposition that a court may necessarily "probe behind
the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question."43
Inevitably, the Court noted, issues of class certification often overlap
with the factual and legal issues pertaining to the cause of action.' As a
result, the majority analyzed the sufficiency of the plaintiffs' evidence of
discrimination in determining the question of commonality.
Under Falcon, a proposed class must bridge the "conceptual gap"
between an individual's claim of workplace discrimination and the exis-
tence of a class of persons suffering from the same injury.45 The Court
found that the plaintiffs could not bridge this gap because they had failed
to show "significant proof' that Wal-Mart "operated under a general
policy of discrimination."46 Although the plaintiffs' sociological expert
testified as to Wal-Mart's vulnerability to gender bias, the Court noted
that he could not determine how stereotypes play a role in employment
decisions with any specificity.47 Because Dr. Bielby could not answer
whether 0.5 percent or ninety-five percent of Wal-Mart's employment
decisions might be determined by stereotyped thinking, the Court con-
cluded that his testimony did nothing to advance the plaintiffs' case.48
The Court similarly found that the plaintiffs' statistical evidence
37. Id. at 2550-51.
38. Id. at 2552.
39. Id. at 2553.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
43. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2553.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2253-54.
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was insufficient to create an inference of discriminatory treatment.49
While the data indicated there were statistically significant gender dis-
parities in pay and promotion, the Court agreed with the dissenting
Ninth Circuit judges' determination that a regional pay disparity cannot
establish disparities at individual stores or create an inference of a com-
pany-wide policy of discrimination.5" The majority further noted that the
statistical evidence was insufficient because the plaintiffs still had to
identify a specific employment practice, rather than "merely showing
that Wal-Mart's policy of discretion has produced an overall sex-based
disparity."51
Finally, the Court found that the plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence was
"too weak to raise any inference that all individual, discretionary person-
nel decisions are discriminatory."52 Distinguishing from its decision in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States," in which the
government offered forty individual accounts of discrimination in a
company of 6,472 employees, the Court found that the 120 affidavits
offered by the Dukes plaintiffs were insufficient to show a general pol-
icy of discrimination given the significant number of Wal-Mart stores
and employees. 4 Because the plaintiffs "provide[d] no convincing proof
of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy," the Court
ultimately concluded that they did not establish the existence of a com-
mon question as required by Rule 23(a)(2).1
In Part III of the Court's opinion, all nine Justices agreed that the
plaintiffs' claims for backpay were improperly certified under Rule
23(b)(2).56 The Court held that claims for monetary relief cannot be cer-
tified under Rule 23(b)(2) where the monetary relief is not incidental to
the requested injunctive or declaratory relief." Because backpay is an
individualized determination, rather than a formulaic one, the Court con-
cluded that such monetary relief was non-incidental and therefore inap-
propriate for Rule 23(b)(2) certification. 8
D. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
The dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices
49. Id. at 2555.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2555-56.
52. Id.
53. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
54. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
55. Id. at 2556-57.
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Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, disagreed with the majority's analysis of
Rule 23(a)'s commonality requirement.5 9 According to the dissent, the
majority erred in conflating Rule 23(a)(2)'s threshold criteria with Rule
23(b)(3)'s more demanding criteria.6" In addition to Rule 23(a)'s
requirement that there be questions of law and fact common to the class,
certification under Rule 23(b)(3) requires an inquiry into whether com-
mon questions "predominate" over individual issues.61 The dissent
argued that "individual differences should not bar a Rule 23(b)(1) or
Rule 23(b)(2) class, so long as the Rule 23(a) threshold is met."'62 In
analyzing the issue of commonality, the majority focused solely on what
distinguished individual class members, rather than on their similari-
ties.6 3 According to the majority, "demonstrating the invalidity of one
manager's use of discretion will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity
of another' S.''64 The dissent noted, however, that because Wal-Mart had
a uniform policy of delegating discretion, that discretion would inevita-
bly be used by store managers in different ways. 65 The fact that each
employee's experience would differ should not be a factor in the Rule
23(a)(2) determination. 66 The dissent found that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions stated "claims of gender discrimination in the form of biased deci-
sion-making in both pay and promotions" and that the evidence
"adequately demonstrated that resolving those claims would necessitate
examination of particular policies and practices alleged to affect,
adversely and globally, women employed at Wal-Mart stores. ' 67 The
dissent argued that Rule 23(a)(2) requires nothing more, and thus the
plaintiffs should have been able to meet the criteria necessary for
commonality.68
Ill. DUKES AND THE NATURE OF MODERN DISCRIMINATION
A. Initial Implications of the Dukes Holding
The Supreme Court's decision in Dukes most obviously represents
a significant blow to plaintiffs seeking to bring suit as a class action. The
majority's holding has carved out a much narrower interpretation of
Rule 23's commonality requirement, thus making it more difficult for a
59. Id. at 2562.
60. Id. at 2565.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2566.




67. Id. at 2555.
68. Id.
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large class of plaintiffs to meet the threshold certification requirements.
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that plaintiffs show that the proposed class mem-
bers' claims share a common question of law or fact.69 According to
Justice Scalia, the plaintiffs had to do more than show that they suffered
the same violation of Title VII.7° Rather, they had to show that the class
members' claims all depended upon a "common contention" capable of
class-wide resolution.7" What mattered was not whether the plaintiffs
raised common questions, but whether a class action would generate
common answers. 72 The Court found that class certification was inap-
propriate because the plaintiffs' claims involved employment decisions
taken at numerous different stores and by numerous decisionmakers.73
As a result, they could not show that their claims for relief would "pro-
duce a common answer" to the question of why they received unfavora-
ble treatment.7 ' This view of commonality consequently creates a higher
standard necessary for class certification.
More interesting, however, is the effect that the Court's decision
will have on individual Title VII claimants. While Dukes was decided at
the class certification stage and was not technically decided on the mer-
its, the majority significantly probed the substantive issues of the case,
making an important statement on the current state of Title VII employ-
ment discrimination claims.
Class certification is governed by the requirements set forth in Rule
23 and is generally viewed as a mainly procedural threshold. 75 Nonethe-
less, in deciding the issue of commonality, the majority noted that an
inquiry into the pleadings' substantive claims is often necessary. Under
General Telephone Co. v. Falcon,7 6 class certification is proper only if
"the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequi-
sites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied."77 That "rigorous analysis" will
often "entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs underlying
claim. '78 Thus, the appropriateness of certification is frequently inter-
twined with the factual and legal issues in dispute.79 In Dukes, the plain-
69. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
70. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. 97, 131-32 (2009)).
73. Id. at 2552.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1439,
1439 (2010) ("Rule 23 governs procedural aspects of class litigation .... (emphasis added)).
76. 457 U.S. 147 (1982).
77. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 161).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2552.
[Vol. 67:637
MORE DECENTRALIZATION, LESS LIABILITY
tiffs' showing of commonality necessarily overlapped with the merits of
the case-namely, whether Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern or practice of
discrimination.8" Accordingly, the Court analyzed the plaintiffs' conten-
tions and weighed the substantive evidence in support of their claims.81
Finding the evidence lacking, the Supreme Court denied certification.82
The court's dismissal of the evidence presented, however, speaks not
only to a showing of commonality at the certification stage, but also at
proving Title VII liability in general. Non-class plaintiffs asserting
claims of systemic disparate treatment will rely on substantially the
same forms of evidence provided by the proposed class members in
Dukes. Because the Supreme Court deemed that evidence insufficient,
individual Title VII plaintiffs will likely face more difficulties in prov-
ing liability.
B. The Subtle Nature of Modern Workplace Discrimination
The Dukes plaintiffs' claims reflect the changing nature of modern
discrimination in the workplace and the difficulty of proving that dis-
crimination in a court of law. Discrimination in the workplace bears a
markedly different appearance from the prejudice of the pre-Civil Rights
era. In decades past, employers were more likely to manifest their
prejudices overtly, blatantly discriminating against minority groups in
their hiring and employment practices. Today, that discrimination has
become more and more taboo. Indeed, with the advent of Title VII and
other related legislation (in addition to increasing cultural pressures),
employers are now much more likely to expressly embrace diversity and
equality in the workplace.83 That is not to say, however, that today's
society has become more tolerant, that prejudice has dissipated from the
work environment. Rather, it is still deeply entrenched in modern soci-
ety, manifesting itself both subtly and covertly. It is "embedded in our
structures, norms, policies, and day-to-day cultural practices."84 As
reflected in Dukes, many employment discrimination lawsuits today do
not center on discriminatory company policies or rules but on corporate
systems that promote subtle and widespread exclusion. Gender discrimi-
nation has become institutional, resulting in continued lower pay, fewer
promotions, and fewer management opportunities for women and other
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2553-57.
82. Id. at 2557.
83. Tristin K. Green, Insular Individualism: Employment Discrimination Law After Ledbetter
v. Goodyear, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 353, 358 (2008) (footnote omitted).
84. Nicole V. Benokraitis, Sex Discrimination in the 21st Century, in SUBTLE SEXISM:
CURRENT PRACTICE AND PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE 5, 6 (Nicole V. Benokraitis ed., 1997).
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minority groups on a systemic level. Because of this shift, plaintiffs
asserting employment discrimination claims are now challenging
employers' overall policies and practices that have a tendency to subju-
gate women.86 The breadth and complexity of such claims create a chal-
lenge for litigants claiming disparate treatment on a systemic level.87
This challenge is further heightened when dealing with large,
national employers. Wal-Mart is the largest retail private employer in
the United States, operating four types of retail stores throughout the
country.88 The stores are divided into seven divisions, comprised of
forty-one regions with eighty to eighty-five stores apiece. 89 In total,
Wal-Mart operates 3,400 stores and employs more than one million peo-
ple.90 Wal-Mart's size and scope mean that its employment practices
affect over one percent of the American workforce. 9' As a large-scale
corporation, Wal-Mart has created an embedded and defined corporate
culture. Part of that culture involves giving broad discretion to local
managers over certain employment decisions. Lower level store manag-
ers have discretion to determine starting salaries and exceptional per-
formance raises for hourly employees, and higher level managers are
able to determine the compensation structure for all in-store salaried
management positions.92 Promotions are also subject to discretion. Can-
didates need only satisfy certain minimal standards, standards that are
easily met by most candidates.93 Thus, managers are given substantial
latitude in who they select for promotions. Furthermore, Wal-Mart did
not require that its management positions be posted.9 4 The plaintiffs in
Dukes alleged that their male counterparts were able to learn about man-
agement opportunities though socializing and that manager's decisions
were infused with partiality given the lack of monitoring by Wal-Mart's
corporate headquarters. 9'
The substantial autonomy given local managers leaves Wal-Mart
susceptible to biased decision-making, despite any official corporate
policy it has to the contrary. Indeed, like most corporations today, Wal-
85. Id. at 24; see also NICOLE V. BENOKRAITIS & JOE R. FEAGIN, MODERN SEXISM: BLATANT,
SUBTLE, AND COVERT DISCRIMINATION 1-5 (2d ed. 1995).
86. Melissa Hart & Paul M. Secunda, A Matter of Context: Social Framework Evidence in
Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 37, 67 (2009).
87. Id.
88. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Lesley Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WArE FOREST L. REV. 95, 95 (2011).
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Mart has an official anti-discrimination policy and outwardly promotes
diversity in the workplace.96 Nonetheless, when employment decisions
are made by lower level supervisors and subject to little managerial
oversight, the efficacy of such policies against bias diminishes
significantly.
IV. TITLE VII AND SYSTEMIC DISPARATE TREATMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national ori-
gin.97 Since its enactment, the courts have recognized that Title VII pro-
hibits all forms of discrimination, both overt and subtle.98 Title VII
jurisprudence is often divided into two categories: disparate impact the-
ory and disparate treatment theory.99
Under disparate impact theory, plaintiffs may challenge an
employer's facially neutral policy that has a "disproportionate effect on
members of a protected class."'" Thus, even if an employment practice
is "fair in form," an employee may still have a cause of action if the
practice is "discriminatory in operation."10' Disparate treatment theory,
on the other hand, requires a showing of intentional discrimination.I"2 In
other words, the plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker acted with
discriminatory animus, "a conscious motivation to discriminate.' 0 3 The
Dukes plaintiffs brought suit under both theories of discrimination.
According to the plaintiffs, Wal-Mart's policy of giving local managers
broad discretion over pay and promotions disproportionately favored
men and thus amounted to disparate impact.' 4 Furthermore, the plain-
tiffs alleged that Wal-Mart was aware of the policy's effect on its female
employees and failed to restrain misuse of its managers' discretionary
authority, leading to disparate treatment of female employees. 10 5 The
crux of the plaintiffs' allegations, however, rested with the latter theory.
More specifically, they alleged disparate treatment on a systemic, rather
than individual level. Their main argument was that Wal-Mart, as a cor-
96. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154 (N.D. Cal. 2004), affd 603 F.3d 571
(9th Cir 2010), rev'd 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
98. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
99. Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account
of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 111 (2003).
100. Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 57 ALA. L.
REV. 741, 750 (2005); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1973).
101. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
102. Green, supra note 99, at 112.
103. Id.
104. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2548 (2011).
105. Id.
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porate entity, knew that its employment practices were creating dispari-
ties among its male and female employees.1
0 6
In the traditional disparate treatment context, the focus is on the
individual decisionmaker. 0 7 The plaintiff must establish a prima facie
case and then show that the employer's reason for the adverse employ-
ment action is in fact pretext for discrimination.108 Conversely, systemic
disparate treatment focuses on the employer as an entity rather than on
the individual decisionmaker.1 °9 It relies on the theory that disparate
treatment is so widespread within the organization, that the entity itself
should be directly liable, rather than vicariously liable for only individ-
ual instances of discrimination.1"0 Under this model, the employer's
responsibility does not depend upon identification of specific instances
of discrimination but on its own role in producing disparate treatment." '
Employers create the work environment, policies, and decisionmaking
structures in which individual decisions are made. I2 Employers are thus
active participants in the discrimination. 3 When disparate treatment
"becomes the regular rather than unusual practice within an organiza-
tion, then it is reasonable to infer that the entity is doing something to
produce decisions based on race or sex within its organization." ' 4 In
other words, under systemic disparate treatment theory, discriminatory
treatment is not the result of "select rogue individuals" but is a product
of organizational and cultural bias within the company. 5 In a claim of
systemic disparate treatment, the plaintiff must show that the employer
engaged in intentional discrimination, either expressly or through a
"pattern or practice" of discrimination.""' 6 "Pattern or practice" cases
require that there be significant disparities between "the makeup of the
employer's workforce and the makeup of the pool from which the
employer draw its employees.
'' 17
The most oft-cited case for systemic "pattern or practice" discrimi-
nation is International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States."8 In
106. Id.
107. Green, supra note 99, at 112.
108. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972) (setting forth the burden-
shifting framework for employment discrimination claims).
109. Green, supra note 99, at 119.
110. Tristin K. Green, The Future of Disparate Treatment Law: After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 395, 400 (2011).
111. Id. at 439.
112. Green, supra note 83, at 380.
113. Id.
114. Green, supra note 110, at 439.
115. Id,
116. Green, supra note 99, at 119.
117. Id.
118. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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Teamsters, the Federal Government brought a Title VII claim against a
motor freight carrier company and a union representing its employees.' 19
It alleged that the employer had engaged in a pattern and practice of
employment discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities in both
hiring and pay, and that the union's seniority system perpetuated this
discrimination. 120 Because the Government contended that the defendant
had engaged in a system-wide pattern or practice of discrimination, it
had to "prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental'
or sporadic discriminatory acts." '121 The Supreme Court ultimately found
that the Government had met that burden. 122 In support of its claims, the
Government produced statistical evidence showing disparities between
minority and white employees as well as testimony of specific instances
of discrimination.1 23 While the company argued that the Government
could not rely on statistics alone to prove the existence of systemic dis-
crimination, the Court held that the individual testimony "brought the
cold numbers convincingly to life."' 124 The Court nonetheless noted that
the use of statistical proof is important in proving the existence of
employment discrimination.2 5 Agreeing with the district court and the
court of appeals, the Supreme Court held that the Government had
proved a prima facie case of systemic employment discrimination.
26
By expressly approving of statistical evidence as proof of system-
wide pattern or practice discrimination, the Supreme Court in Teamsters
"opened the door for a structural account of disparate treatment."' 27 In
other words, it accepted analysis of an employer's institutional policies
and practices rather than analysis of the employer's individual state of
mind. 2 ' This inquiry, furthermore, relies significantly on statistical
analyses, which the Court has consistently accepted as creating an infer-
ence of systemic disparate treatment since its decision in Teamsters.129
This is because statistics showing disparities amongst minorities are
often indicative of purposeful discrimination. 130 The Teamsters Court
set out a two-phase burden-shifting framework for systemic disparate
119. Id. at 328.
120. Id. at 329.
121. Id. at 336.
122. Id. at 337.
123. Id. at 337-38.
124. Id. at 339.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 342.
127. Green, supra note 99, at 120.
128. Id.
129. Green, supra note 110, at 403.
130. Jason R. Bent, The Telltale Sign of Discrimination: Probabilities, Information
Asymmetries, and the Systemic Disparate Treatment Theory, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 797, 798
(2011).
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treatment cases.1 3 1 First, the plaintiff must show that the employer
engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.132 If the plaintiff suc-
ceeds, it creates a rebuttable presumption that all individual employment
decisions were discriminatory in nature. 133 The employer then bears the
burden of rebutting that presumption.1 34 This framework allows plain-
tiffs to create an inference of discriminatory intent, a necessary showing
in all disparate treatment claims.
3 5
V. THE EFFECT OF DuKEs ON DISPARATE TREATMENT CLAIMS
The significance of the Supreme Court's decision in Dukes is its
effect on plaintiffs' ability to prove systemic disparate treatment in the
workplace. While the Teamsters decision represented an approval of sta-
tistical and anecdotal evidence in support of a showing of discrimina-
tion, the Dukes Court specifically distinguished Teamsters in rejecting
the sufficiency of the proposed class members' evidence. In denying
class certification, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed
to produce significant evidence proving the Wal-Mart had a general pol-
icy of discrimination. 136 The Court found that the plaintiffs' evidence
was insufficient to establish a claim of discriminatory bias.'37 In support
of their argument for commonality, the plaintiffs produced three types of
evidence: statistical evidence showing gender disparities in pay and pro-
motions; 120 affidavits from female employees detailing specific
instances of discrimination; and testimony from an expert sociologist
concerning Wal-Mart's vulnerability to gender bias.
138
Despite Teamster's acceptance of statistical evidence, the Supreme
Court in Dukes concluded that the statistics offered by the plaintiffs'
expert did not reflect the storewide disparities necessary to prove com-
monality.139 The majority agreed with Ninth Circuit Judge Ikuta's obser-
vation that "[i]nformation about disparities at the regional and national
level does not establish the existence of disparities at individual stores,
let alone raise the inference that company-wide policy of discrimination
is implemented by discretionary decisions at the store and district
level."'4 ° The Court further concluded that even if the statistical figures




135. Id. at 817.
136. Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart,
106 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 34, 38 (2011).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 39.
139. Id. at 40.
140. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011).
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did establish a pay or promotion pattern different from the nationwide or
regional figures in all Wal-Mart stores, the plaintiffs would still fail to
prove commonality because each store manager would claim different
reasons for the discrepancies. 1 ' Absent identification of a "specific
employment practice," the Court found that evidence of statistical dis-
parities among male and female employees were insufficient.' 42 Prece-
dent has established, however, that a policy giving unrestrained
discretion to local managers is sufficient to make a disparate treatment
claim.'43 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg noted that an employer's
"undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking" is an "employment
practice that may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach."'"
Nonetheless, the majority concluded that the evidence was insufficient
to establish a claim a disparate treatment.
The Court found that the plaintiffs' anecdotal evidence was simi-
larly inadequate. While the plaintiffs offered substantially the same
forms of evidence offered by the plaintiffs in Teamsters, the Court dis-
tinguished that case based on the sheer number of plaintiffs in the pur-
ported class. In Teamsters, the plaintiffs produced forty affidavits from
employees in support of their discrimination claims.' 45 Because the
company had 6,472 employees, of whom 571 were minorities, it
amounted to approximately one anecdote for every eight class mem-
bers. 14 6 The Dukes plaintiffs, on the other hand, produced 120 affidavits
for a class of 1.5 million-about one for every 12,500 class members
and relating to only a fraction of Wal-Mart stores. 47 Consequently, the
Court found that the affidavits proffered by the plaintiffs were not suffi-
ciently representative in scope. The Court's dismissal of this evidence is
significant because plaintiffs attempting to sue large corporations such
as Wal-Mart will face an incredible challenge producing a sufficient
ratio of anecdotal evidence to number of employees. Had the Dukes
plaintiffs produced the same ratio of affidavits as provided in Teamsters,
they would have had to produce 187,500 affidavits for the 1.5 million
member class. 14 8 Such a requirement would be staggeringly expensive
and inefficient. The Court further found that even if all of the accounts
of discrimination were true, they were still insufficient to demonstrate
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Malveaux, supra note 136, at 40.
144. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338 (1977).
146. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
147. Id.
148. Malveaux, supra note 136, at 41.
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that the company "operates under a general policy of discrimination."' 14 9
The higher evidentiary standard that the Court has set out will make
proving disparate treatment, in addition to commonality, much more dif-
ficult for Title VII plaintiffs.
Finally, the Court rejected the testimony offered by the plaintiffs'
sociological expert because he could not determine "whether 0.5 percent
or 95 percent of the employment decisions at Wal-Mart might be deter-
mined by stereotyped thinking."'15° As noted by Professor Suzette
Malveaux, however, the answer to that question "is not only unknown,
but unknowable."'' "Given the subtle, complex, and sometimes even
unconscious nature of modem discrimination, it would be practically
impossible to determine with any specificity how much gender bias
infected the workplace."'52 Indeed, absent a facially discriminatory cor-
porate policy, plaintiffs will now face an uphill battle to prove their dis-
parate treatment claims given the Court's unwillingness to recognize
these forms of evidence.
Given the nature of modem discrimination, the Court's rejection of
the Dukes plaintiffs' evidence will not only have far-reaching conse-
quences for plaintiffs seeking class certification, but also for individual
plaintiffs seeking redress for employment discrimination under a theory
of disparate treatment. Interestingly, many scholars discussing the Dukes
decision have focused on its impact on Title VII liability rather than on
the issue of class certification. 53 Although the Court's decision will not
entirely prevent women from filing individual claims, "their ability to
investigate a harmful pattern and practice of discrimination will be sub-
stantially hindered."'5 4 Furthermore, individual employees will be less
likely to sue given the expense of litigation and the high evidentiary
standard that the Court has set forth. 155
More and more, individual plaintiffs are likely to rely on a theory
of systemic disparate treatment as opposed to individual disparate treat-
ment due to the changing nature of discrimination in the workplace.
149. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556.
150. Id. at 2553.
151. Malveaux, supra note 136, at 43.
152. Id.
153. See Room for Debate: A Death Blow to Class Action?, N.Y. TiMES, June 20, 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action (featuring a
discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Dukes).
154. Tanya Hernandez, Far From Random Bias, N.Y. TIMrs, June 21, 2011, http://www.ny
times.com/roomfordebate/2011/06/20/a-death-blow-to-class-action/wal-mart-far-from-random-
bias.
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Most instances of discriminatory treatment are the result of subtle, insti-
tutional deficiencies, rather than blatant prejudice against minority
workers. Overt discrimination has become taboo in today's society, giv-
ing rise to corporate policies encouraging diversity in the workforce. In
fact, the Supreme Court's skepticism in Dukes over the plaintiffs' evi-
dence of disparate treatment was augmented by the fact that Wal-Mart
has an official policy against gender discrimination. 156 But this places
undue weight on the existence of such policies in combatting discrimina-
tion. A statement in an employee handbook says nothing about the
actual absence of discriminatory employment practices. The "mere pres-
ence of a written anti-discrimination policy" should not be enough to
shield an employer from Title VII liability. 157 Most employers today
have anti-discrimination policies in place but this bears no indication of
an actual lack of minority bias.1 58 Rather, discrimination continues to
occur in a subtle, pervasive manner.
Because of this subtlety, it is more difficult for disparate treatment
plaintiffs to show discrimination on an individual basis.1 59 "It occurs
subtly, in day-to-day interactions, in decisions that do not lend easily to
immediate comparison, in unstated judgments and perceptions of value
and skills."' 6 ° It is more easily identified in the aggregate, upon a show-
ing that members of a group are treated less favorably in terms of pay
and promotions.' 6 ' It is also difficult to prove because employers are
less likely to explicitly reveal any biases they may have when making
employment decisions.'62 Thus, in alleging claims of disparate treat-
ment, many individual Title VII plaintiffs will have to rely on evidence
that reveals discrimination on system-wide, institutional level. A theory
of systemic disparate treatment consequently allows plaintiffs to do this
without having to necessarily identify specific, individual biases on the
part of their employers. In proving that the entity itself is directly
responsible for perpetuating disparate treatment, plaintiffs will most
often rely on statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, and social scientist
testimony-the three main forms of evidence relied upon by the plain-
tiffs in Dukes.
6 3
Statistical evidence is an important facet in systemic disparate treat-
ment cases because it demonstrates proof of consistent and prevalent
156. Malveaux, supra note 136, at 43.
157. Id.
158. Id.




163. Id. at 444.
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discrimination." 64 In fact, the Court indicated in Teamsters that statistics
alone may be sufficient to create an inference of disparate treatment.
165
Statistical evidence is used to show large-scale disparities between male
and female employees, a necessary indication of company-wide discrim-
ination. By controlling for external elements, expert statisticians can
determine whether any statistically significant disparities are the product
of discriminatory disparate treatment. 66 Plaintiffs also bolster statistical
evidence with both anecdotal accounts and social science testimony.
167
Anecdotal evidence provides a stronger reason to believe that statistical
disparities are caused by discriminatory practices, as opposed to other
non-discriminatory factors. 68 Finally, social science testimony has
become increasingly used by plaintiffs due the changing nature of dis-
crimination. 69 Plaintiffs rely on this type of evidence, along with statis-
tical evidence, to show that discrimination is caused by the employer's
internal procedures. 170 Generally, social science testimony consists of an
analysis of a company's decision-making criteria, demographic dispari-
ties, and corporate culture to determine whether they are likely to result
in "biased employment decisions.""' Dr. Bielby, for example, testified
on behalf of the Dukes plaintiffs that Wal-Mart's corporate culture of
giving discretion to local managers made it susceptible to discrimina-
tion. ' According to his testimony, "social science research demon-
strates that gender stereotypes are especially likely to influence
personnel decisions when they are based on subjective factors, because
substantial decisionmaker discretion tends to allow people to seek out
and retain stereotyping-confirming information and ignore or minimize
information that defies stereotypes."'
173
After the Supreme Court's rejection of this evidence in Dukes, it
seems increasingly unlikely that plaintiffs asserting systemic employ-
ment discrimination claims will be able to meet the evidentiary thresh-
old necessary to prove a pattern or practice of discrimination. This is
especially true when dealing with large, nationwide corporations such as
Wal-Mart that employ millions of people and who have a sizable influ-
ence on the American workforce. Showing that a company's internal
164. Id.
165. id.; see also Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
166. Green, supra note 110, at 444.
167. Id.
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organization perpetuates prejudice is an onerous task when having to
prove it on such a large scale. A single employee is unlikely to be finan-
cially equipped to fund the extensive discovery necessary to establish
her claim. And given the difficulty of proceeding as a class post-Dukes,
many will likely be discouraged from filing legitimate claims.
The consequences of the Dukes holding reflect a pattern of proce-
dural obstacles for Title VII plaintiffs. Employment discrimination
plaintiffs already bear numerous burdens in federal court. 174 The statis-
tics in these cases are indeed discouraging. Between 1988 and 2003,
employment discrimination claims rose significantly but have concluded
with much fewer resolutions. 175 According to a 2004 study on employ-
ment discrimination cases in federal court, plaintiffs win a lower propor-
tion of cases during pretrial and trial and have a harder time upholding
successful outcomes on appeal. 176 The statistics show that between 1979
and 2006, the plaintiff "win rate" in federal court for employment cases
was fifteen percent as compared to fifty-one percent for non-employ-
ment cases. 177 Furthermore, employment discrimination plaintiffs won
3.59% of pretrial adjudications, while other plaintiffs won 21.05%.178
Many of these obstacles can be attributed to more stringent proce-
dural requirements at the pleading and summary judgment phases, mak-
ing it more difficult for plaintiffs to even get to trial. The Supreme
Court's decisions in both Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly' 79and Ashcroft
v. Iqbal8 ° have created a heightened pleading standard, requiring plain-
tiffs to plead their allegations with "plausibility." Moving away from the
notice pleading standard set forth in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Conley v. Gibson,'8 ' federal courts now require plaintiffs
to assert more at the pleading stage in order to avoid dismissal. The
Court has similarly placed heavy burdens on plaintiffs at the summary
judgment phase by requiring that parties opposing summary judgment
motions come forward with specific facts showing a genuine issue of
material fact, a showing that must be beyond a "metaphysical doubt."' 82
These heightened standards have created more burdensome obstacles for
174. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The
Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 517,
520 (2010).
175. Id. at 524-25.
176. Id.; see also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 103, 103 (2009).
177. Schneider, supra note 174, at 526.
178. Id.
179. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
180. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
181. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
182. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
2013]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs, obstacles that have been borne disproportionately by litigants
pursuing discrimination claims. Federal Judicial Center studies of sum-
mary judgment practice, for example, have determined that seventy-
seven percent of summary judgment motions in employment discrimina-
tion cases were granted, as compared with sixty-one percent of summary
judgment motions in tort cases and fifty-nine percent of summary judg-
ment motions in contracts cases.
18 3
These procedural obstacles have only been intensified by the
Supreme Court's decision in Dukes. By rejecting the plaintiffs' motion
for class certification on commonality grounds, the Court has made it
more difficult for plaintiffs asserting discrimination to proceed as a
class. One may argue that this is only a minor setback because the denial
of class certification is not fatal to a claim. The purported class members
can merely proceed as individual claimants. This argument is misguided
for several reasons. First, individual claimants are much less likely to be
able to afford litigation against a national corporation with endless
resources. Second, and more importantly, the Court's decision in Dukes
indicates that individual plaintiffs are still likely to lose on the merits
due to the Court's skepticism of their evidence. As Justice Scalia made
clear, there is a strong interrelationship between procedure and sub-
stance. While the Court's decision was decidedly "procedural" in nature,
its substantive impact cannot be ignored.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's reversal of class certification to the 1.5 mil-
lion Dukes plaintiffs represents an additional hurdle to employment dis-
crimination litigants. Given the subtle nature of discrimination in the
modem workplace, it is becoming increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to
hold companies liable for discriminatory practices. To hold employers
liable, Title VII plaintiffs must establish that the employer's policies and
practices create a culture that fosters discrimination on a systemic level.
In order to prove this, plaintiffs have historically relied on expert and
anecdotal evidence to demonstrate widespread discriminatory practices.
By discounting that evidence in Dukes, the Court seems to have created
a more stringent evidentiary threshold necessary to establish Title VII
liability. Although the issue on appeal related to the procedural require-
ments for class certification under Rule 23(a), the Court's analysis of the
merits of the plaintiffs' claims holds many implications for the future of
Title VII litigation. Given the proof necessary to establish a claim of
disparate treatment, individual litigants are less likely to succeed on their
183. Schneider, supra note 174, at 549.
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substantive claims. Thus, large-scale employers such as Wal-Mart are
much less likely to be held directly accountable for their institutional
discriminatory practices and will have little incentive to create a corpo-
rate culture embracing diversity and equality in the workplace.
